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A critical element of word of mouth (WOM) or buzz marketing is to identify seeds, often central actors with
high degree in the social network. Seed identification typically requires data on the full network structure,
which is often unavailable. We therefore examine the impact of WOM seeding strategies motivated by the
friendship paradox to obtain more central nodes without knowing network structure. But higher-degree nodes
may communicate less with neighbors; therefore whether friendship paradox motivated seeding strategies
increase or reduce WOM and adoption remains an empirical question. We develop and estimate a model
of WOM and adoption using data on microfinance adoption across 43 villages in India for which we have
data on social networks. Counterfactuals show that the proposed seeding strategies are about 15-20% more
e↵ective than random seeding in increasing adoption. Remarkably, they are also about 5-11% more e↵ective
than opinion leader seeding, and are relative more e↵ective when we have fewer seeds.
Latest version at: http://faculty.som.yale.edu/vineetkumar/research/BuzzFriends.pdf
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1. Introduction
Firm-initiated and consumer-driven word of mouth (WOM) marketing (often referred to as buzz
marketing), has received a lot of attention, and has proven e↵ective in increasing adoption across a
wide range of products and services. WOM has been examined both theoretically and empirically
using a wide range of modeling approaches to understand both the motivations to engage in it and
its various impacts (Godes and Mayzlin 2009, Iyengar et al. 2011, Campbell et al. 2017, Berger
and Iyengar 2013).
An important question in WOM marketing is how to choose appropriate seeds. There are a
few broad approaches considered in the literature. The first uses network data on connections
to identify central individuals (degree or eigenvector or betweenness) to provide the most WOM
(Tucker 2008, Goldenberg et al. 2009, Libai et al. 2013). Recently, researchers have also tried to
combine multiple networks among the same individuals to identify seeds with specific relationship
types that might lead to higher adoption (Chen et al. 2017). The second uses characteristics of
individuals to identify how opinion leaders who be used to seed networks (Iyengar et al. 2011).
Opinion leaders are often highly context-specific and may not span multiple categories, e.g. an
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opinion leader in fashion might not be so when it comes to consumer electronics or healthcare
(King and Summers 1970).
Another approach is to identify seeds based on local network properties and community char-
acteristics to achieve higher di↵usion (Yoganarasimhan 2012). There might be tradeo↵s in terms
of the local structure, where network structures that enable high diversity of content might not
be e cient at accelerating the flow of information (Aral and Van Alstyne 2011). The outcome of
di↵usion might typically be context-dependent, and thus an approach that is broadly applicable
and theoretically founded would be helpful.
Broadly, the emphasis in the recent literature has been to improve seed identification using
richer and and more comprehensive network data. However, even with easier access to online social
networks, data on the right or relevant network for a particular purpose is often unavailable. For
example, even if one had access to the Facebook social networks of everyone including physicians,
the desired physician-to-physician network data for seeding a new drug may be unavailable. Even
within a specific context, there are a number of challenges to gathering accurate network data,
including the time and e↵ort required to obtain this data (Stark 2018). Moreover, the dynamically
evolving nature of connections and relationships requires frequent updating of such data. Social
media data, which are relatively easier to access also face the challenge that activity there maybe
more of a substitute than a complement to o✏ine or other social interactions (Borgatti et al. 2009).
This paper investigates a complementary approach that obviates the need to use detailed network
data by introducing WOM seeding strategies when the relevant network structure information is
unavailable. The strategies leverage the Friendship Paradox to identify more connected individuals
for seeding irrespective of the underlying network structure.
Friendship Paradox and Network Seeding Strategies
Put simply, the friendship paradox can be stated as “On average, your friends have more friends
than you do.” The paradox has a mathematical foundation and holds independent of network
structure, because popular people are always overrepresented when averaging over friends (Feld
1991). This over-representation suggests potential strategies for sampling higher degree individuals
(ones with more friends) in any network, without knowing network structure (Kumar et al. 2018).
This sampling approach of choosing a random friend is termed as the “Local Friend Strategy” (local
friend of friend) and is informationally light in that it only requires access to a set of randomly
sampled individuals, and the ability to obtain a random friend from them. The other advantage is
that the list of relevant friends from which to sample can be easily adjusted as appropriate for the
particular seeding problem at hand. The friendship paradox proof guarantees that individuals with
higher than average degree are obtained in expectation, allowing for potentially better seeding.
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Even though one can sample higher degree individuals using these strategies, their use as seeds
cannot guarantee greater WOM or product adoption, because the extent to which higher degree
individuals communicate with friends in their network about the product is an empirical question.
In a recent study, Kim et al. (2015) found that selecting the highest degree nodes did not result in
higher adoption relative to random seeding. They also found mixed evidence for the e↵ectiveness
of friend nominations across two di↵erent categories; the mixed e↵ects could be due to di↵erences
in network structure across the villages in their treatment and control groups. In fact, we show
that network characteristics can impact the e↵ectiveness of these seeding strategies.1
The above discussion motivates our research questions below.
(1) Can friendship paradox based seeding strategies improve WOM and adoption relative to
random and opinion leader based strategies? By how much?
(2) Can hybrid approaches leveraging the friendship paradox along with an individual’s “leader”
characteristics lead to higher adoption?
(3) How does the extent of initial seeding (fraction of the network seeded) impact relative per-
formance of the strategies?
(4) How does network structure moderate the relative e↵ectiveness of the seeding strategies?
To address these questions, we empirically model the WOM and product adoption process over
networks by allowing for a flexible relationship between degree and WOM. Further, in contrast
to typical di↵usion models which assume that all WOM arises from adopters, our model incor-
porates WOM from both adopters and non-adopters, which enables us to quantify their relative
contribution to WOM.
Estimating such a WOM di↵usion model is challenging because typically the necessary multi-
network data is unavailable. Most di↵usion models are estimated based on one product’s time
series of adoption through one market (or social network). Further, the original seeding is typi-
cally unobserved, and even if observed it is not possible to identify the e↵ect of seeding choices
without multiple di↵usion paths across similar networks. Finally, the impact of WOM might be
mis-identified in the presence of advertising (Van den Bulte and Lilien 2001).
In this paper, we are able to address each of these challenges through data on one product
(microfinance) adoption across 43 independent and relatively isolated village social networks in
India. The firm’s seeding across the di↵erent villages leads to exogenous variation in network
1 It is challenging to control for network structure experimentally since the number of possible networks
structures grows exponentially in the number of nodes. ForN = 100 nodes, there are 2
N(N 1)
2 ⇡ 101490 possible
undirected network structures. There have been recent e↵orts at evaluating the e↵ectiveness of random and
multi-hop stochastic seeding strategies using nonparametric estimation approaches (Chin et al. 2018), where
the typical assumption is that seed sets are mapped to outcomes in a fixed manner.
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position and characteristics of seeds, which aids in identifying the impact of seeding. Also, there
was no advertising or promotion activity by the firm that would confound WOM e↵ects.
Based on the estimates, we simulate counterfactuals on WOM and product adoption across these
villages as a function of alternative WOM seeding strategies. Finally, we compare the e↵ectiveness
of the friendship paradox based Local Friend and hybrid seeding strategies relative to random and
opinion leader based strategies.
2. Data
We use panel data on the di↵usion and adoption of microfinance across households belonging to
43 villages in Southern India in combination with rich network data on the social connections
among the households within each village. The data was collected and described in Banerjee et al.
(2013). The microfinance firm identified opinion leaders based on leader and social criteria in
each village prior to entry and seeded information about the microfinance product among these
individuals first. Tables 1, 2 and 3 provide the summary statistics of household characteristics,
village social networks and microfinance adoption in the villages. In Table 3, the statistics are for
giant component within each network.2
From Table 1, we see that households have an average of more than 4 individuals. 91% of
households have electricity, but only 29% of households have latrines. We note the relatively lower
variation in the number of people relative to rooms or beds across the households.
Table 1 Summary Statistics of Households
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Number of People in Household 4.484 0.535 3.337 5.832
Rooms 2.308 0.413 0.754 2.939
Beds 0.878 0.455 0.293 2.268
Electricity Indicator 0.915 0.114 0.234 0.982
Latrine Indicator 0.290 0.155 0.020 0.909
Proportion of Leaders (%) 12.552 3.159 7 21
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of the village social networks. There is considerable
variation in the extent of relationships among households. Each village contains on average 212
households. Across villages, the mean degree (connections) of households is around 9, The mean
2 The giant component of a network is the largest connected component of the network, excluding isolated
nodes.
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Table 2 Summary Statistics of Village Networks
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Number of Households 212.233 53.536 107 341
Number of Connections 1,031.791 334.113 365 2,015
Degree:
Mean 9.656 1.642 6.822 13.593
Standard Deviation 7.085 1.321 5.175 11.019
Minimum 1.000 0.000 1 1
Maximum 39.721 13.010 23 90
Mean of Leaders 12.935 2.594 8.880 18.818
Other Network Characteristics:
Density 0.048 0.013 0.024 0.077
Global Clustering 0.198 0.037 0.129 0.282
Average Path Length (APL) 2.770 0.207 2.432 3.316
Degree Assortativity  0.078 0.054  0.260 0.090
Table 3 Summary Statistics of Adoption (%)
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Population 19.382 8.160 8 45
Leader 24.713 12.637 3.571 53.846
Followers 18.677 8.190 7.296 43.713
Electrified Households 19.005 8.384 7.339 45.122
Non-electrified Households 20.716 13.256 0 50
Latrine Households 14.685 9.167 0.000 36.364
Non-latrine Households 21.852 9.893 7.031 51.250
of the standard deviation of degree for households at the village level is large at around 7.1, with
the minimum and maximum also reflecting wide variation. The mean degree of opinion leaders is
higher than the average and close to the maximum of average degree across villages. Given the
much higher than average degree of the opinion leaders, the relative superiority of our proposed
friendship paradox based seeding relative to opinion leader seeding is truly an empirical question.
Finally, note that the variation in degree across villages and among households within villages
provides the identifying variation to estimate the di↵usion model proposed in Section 3 below.
In terms of other network characteristics, we consider four “classic” or most important structural
features of networks: (a) density, (b) average path length (APL), (c) clustering, and (d) degree
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assortativity. Density captures how well connected a network is, and is characterized by the ratio
of connections to all possible combinations of household pairs. The average path length (APL) is a
measure of reachability, and a lower value of this metric indicates a network in which it is possible
to reach any node from another node through a short number of intermediate nodes. This notion
is related to the popular idea of “six degrees of separation.” Clustering is a measure of transitivity,
indicating the propensity for friends of an individual to be mutual friends with each other. Networks
that demonstrate high clustering feature close and tightly bound community structures, whereas
in networks with low clustering, dyadic relationships are of primary importance. Finally, degree
assortativity captures whether households with similar degree are connected to each other. When
high (low) degree to other high (low) degree nodes), networks have positive assortativity, when
high (low) degree nodes are connected to low (high) degree nodes, there is negative assortativity.3
The precise definitions of network characteristics are provided in the Supplement (Table EC.2). We
will investigate how the relative performance of di↵erent seeding strategies varies based on these
network characteristics.
The primary objective of study here is the adoption of microfinance by households across the
villages, detailed in Table 3. 19.2% of households adopt microfinance, with significant variation
across the villages. Opinion leaders are more likely to adopt than followers, perhaps a feature
of the information propagation chosen by the firm, which targeted these leaders in each village.
Adoption is correlation with Household characteristics; electrified households are less likely to
adopt compared to non-electrified, and households with a latrine are less likely to adopt than those
without. Broadly, these results suggest that microfinance is needed by households at the bottom
of the pyramid in emerging markets.
3. Model and Estimation
We use a model of WOM and product adoption across a social network. Using network terminology,
households are nodes and connections between them are edges. Households need to be informed
about the product in order to adopt. Households who are informed communicate with their neigh-
bors probabilistically, even if they have not adopted. Our model is based on Banerjee et al. (2013),
with a key adaptation needed to study our research question related to the friendship paradox.
The critical di↵erence is that we allow the probability of WOM from a node to di↵er by degree and
for those identified as “leaders” by the firm. Banerjee et al. (2013) allow the probability of WOM
3
As a point of comparison, Facebook and Twitter have very low density relative to the village social networks at
2.01⇥ 10 4 and 8.463⇥ 10 7 respectively; while their assortativity is more negative than village networks at  0.67
and  0.88 respectively (Kunegis 2013).
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to depends on adoption status but not on the number of connections (degree) or for “leaders”. It
is helpful to understand why we need to extend their model.
If we choose their specification, we will obtain a probability of communication that depends on
adoption status but not on the number of connections (degree). Our approach based on Friend-
ship Paradox obtains higher degree nodes than average. Thus, we chose a conservative approach,
allowing for the idea that which high degree nodes may be better due to their degree, they might
also be less likely to communicate with their friends. If we did not account for that, then we would
be biasing the results in favor of the friendship paradox strategy. Similarly, accounting for di↵er-
ences in WOM among firm designated “leaders” is critical to assess the e↵ectiveness of the leader
strategies.
Baseline Model
Word of Mouth Communication: WOM occurs in the network when a household receives informa-
tion (only) from its informed neighbors. We allow WOM probability ps(D) to depend on adoption
status s and degree D.








Thus, qsmin represents the WOM probability for a node with minimum degree (D=Dmin), whereas
qsmax represents the WOM probability for the highest degree node with adoption status s. These
quantities are based on the minimum and maximum degrees across all networks. Both parameters
depend on the adoption status s 2 {NA,A} of the node, with NA indicating “Not Adopted” and
A indicating “Adopted.” The specification in Banerjee et al. (2013) is a special case of this model
when qmin = qmax = q, such that WOM is independent of degree. Nodes continue communicating
with neighbors in periods after they become informed.
Adoption: When a household becomes aware of the product at time t, the household’s decision
of whether to adopt, y 2 {0,1}, is modeled as a standard logit choice with observed heterogeneity.
The utility of household i from adoption and non-adoption is:
ui(y= 1) =  0 + Xi + ✏i,1
ui(y= 0) = ✏i,0 (2)
Xi represents the vector of leader characteristics of household i,   the vector of coe cients, and
✏i,s are distributed as Type I EV random variables.
After a node becomes informed either as an initial seed or through a neighbor, further WOM
from others does not impact the likelihood of adoption. Thus, WOM is purely informational rather
than persuasive.
While the baseline model provides a useful benchmark, it leads to the question of whether there
are more complex decision processes for communication and adoption.
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Endorsement or Persuasion
In the endorsement or persuasion model, (termed “complex contagion” by Centola and Macy
(2007)), likelihood of adoption varies based on whether WOM is received from more friends. Fol-
lowing Banerjee et al. (2013), the utility of adoption is:
ui(y= 1) =  0 + Xi + Fit + ✏i,1 (3)
where Fit is the fraction of neighbors who have informed i about microfinance and   is the endorse-
ment parameter. The utility of non-adoption remains unchanged.
Leader E↵ects
Leaders selected as seeds by the firm may have unobserved individual characteristics (leadership)
that lead to higher probability of WOM relative to non-leaders, over and above their higher degree.
Further, firms may have provided specific information to their selected leader seeds, which may
make their WOM more e↵ective. To capture such di↵erences, we extend the baseline model to
allow for di↵erential probability of WOM for leaders:










Thus, if leaders are especially e↵ective in spreading WOM, we would find the parameter q` to be
positive, whereas a negative value would indicate leaders are less e↵ective than others.
Non-linear Impact of Degree
Finally, we allow WOM likelihood to be nonlinear in degree by allowing a quadratic e↵ect, which
can also capture potential non-montonicity.













where qQ represents the parameter corresponding to the quadratic term.
Estimation
The model estimation proceeds in three steps similar to Banerjee et al. (2013), with some di↵erences
as detailed in Supplement §EC.2. Here we provide a high level description of the three steps. For
estimation details, see Section EC.2.
Step 1: Adoption Process – We estimate the adoption process parameters   with a logistic
regression using the adoption decisions of only the initially seeded individuals based on equation
(3).







the method of simulated moments (MSM). Given the data, we use the same set of seven moments
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Table 4 List of Moments
1. Cumulative adoption upto time t (Time series moment)
2. Proportion of seeds adopting
3. Proportion of households with no adopting neighbors who have adopted
4. Proportion of neighbors of adopting seeds who have adopted
5. Proportion of neighbors of non-adopting seeds who have adopted
6. Covariance between a household’s adoption and average adoption of its first degree neighbors
7. Covariance between a household’s adoption and average adoption of its second degree neighbors
used in Banerjee et al. (2013) listed in Table 4. Overall, the moments capture key aspects of di↵u-
sion within a network, both globally over the entire network and locally across connections. The
first moment captures the overall adoption over time across a network. This is the only time series
moment. The remaining six are cross-sectional moments. The second moment is global, matching
overall adoption levels in the network. Moments 3-5 are local moments that fit household level
adoption as a function of adoption characteristics of their neighbors, and help identify communica-
tion probabilities for non-adopters and adopters respectively. Moments 6-7 are also local moments
in that they capture covariance in adoption between a household and its first and second degree
neighbors respectively.4






















where mS(✓) represents the vector of model (simulated moments), mD denotes the vector of data
moments. W is the weighing matrix, and can either be estimated with a two–stage approach or be




Step 3: Standard Errors – We estimate the standard errors using a block-bootstrap resampling
procedure of sampling with replacement, treating each network as a block.
4. Results
Table 5 reports the adoption model estimates. The number of beds in the household and the rooms
per person are negatively associated with adoption probability, whereas access to latrine in the
home and beds per person has a positive impact. The estimates are not only consistent with the
idea that microfinance is typically used by poorer households without access to traditional banking
services, but that the poorest households are not the biggest adopters.
4
We provide precise specification of the moments and the rationale for using them in the supplement (Section EC.3).
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Rooms per person  1.023⇤⇤⇤ (0.392)
Beds per person 1.147⇤ (0.656)
Log Likelihood  603.093
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
We examine a number of di↵erent models, summarized in Table 6. Overall, we have 8 specifica-
tions. The first 4 models have no endorsement or persuasion e↵ect (denoted by superscript E= 0).
In ME=01 , the WOM probability does not depend on degree. This model is identical to the model
in Banerjee et al. (2013). However we used optimization algorithms for estimation rather than grid
search. In ME=02 , the WOM probability depends on degree as detailed in Section 3. M
E=0
3 incor-
porates a di↵erential e↵ect for leaders to the prior model specification. ME=04 , allows for nonlinear
relationship between WOM probability and degree with a quadratic function. The next four models
are identical to the first four, but with an endorsement e↵ect (denoted by superscript E= 1).
















No Endorsement X X X X
Endorsement X X X X
Degree-Independent WOM X X
Degree-dependent WOM X X X X X X
Leader Di↵erential WOM X X X X
Quadratic E↵ect: WOM and Degree X X
Table 7 reports the estimates for the 8 WOM models. We use the SMM J-statistic (a measure of
fit) for model selection. Based on the Sargan’s J-test using the J-statistic, we cannot reject the null
that the model is valid. Given that the J-statistic is lowest for Models ME=02 (without endorsement)
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and ME=12 (with endorsement), we use these as our primary specifications to interpret parameters
and for counterfactual analysis.5
Table 7 Model Estimates
Model Specification: Estimates (Standard Errors)
No Endorsement With Endorsement















Non-adopter lowest degree qNAmin 0.041 0.036 0.061 0.061 0.041 0.041 0.061 0.056
(0.001) (0.004) (0.011) (0.033) (0.003) (0.004) (0.019) (0.023)
Non-adopter highest degree qNAmax 0.041 0.036 0.051 0.051 0.041 0.038 0.051 0.038
(0.001) (0.012) (0.0001) (0.016) (0.003) (0.007) (0.068) (0.062)
Adopter lowest degree qAmin 0.341 0.400 0.386 0.366 0.362 0.339 0.396 0.406
(0.012) (0.086) (0.028) (0.003) (0.009) (0.014) (0.047) (0.059)
Adopter highest degree qAmax 0.341 0.348 0.338 0.339 0.362 0.356 0.309 0.326
(0.012) (0.106) (0.034) (0.073) (0.009) (0.029) (0.052) (0.048)
Endorsement   – – – – -0.036 -0.007 -0.021 -0.034
– – – – (0.046) (0.076) (0.067) (0.07)
Leader E↵ect q` – – -0.022 -0.021 – – -0.021 -0.014
(0.012) (0.046) (0.007) (0.01)
Quadratic E↵ect qQ – – – 0.029 – – – 0.016
(0.053) (0.03)
J-Statistic (⇥10 6) 2.905 2.837 3.268 3.179 3.088 2.967 3.333 3.337
In Models ME=01 and M
E=1





We first interpret the parameter estimates of the preferred model specificationsME=02 andM
E=1
2 .
We begin with the case of no endorsement. First, the WOM probability for adopters is much
higher than that of non-adopters, by an order of magnitude (qAmin   qNAmin). Next, we examine
degree dependence. For non-adopters, the WOM probability does not depend on household degree
(qNAmin ⇡ qNAmax), so that low-degree households are as likely as high-degree households to communicate
with each of their network neighbors. For adopters, however, the high-degree households are less
likely to communicate with each of their peers relative to low-degree households (qAmax < q
A
min). Yet,
high-degree households communicate more overall since they have more connections.
FromME=03 andM
E=0
4 , we find no di↵erential e↵ect of leaders; the parameter q` is small, negative
and not statistically significant, implying that leaders neither communicate more nor are more
e↵ective. For the quadratic e↵ect, we do not find qQ to be statistically significant.
5
The counterfactual performance under all of the models are provided in the Supplement of the paper (Section EC.7).
We also discuss additional model fit metrics in the Supplement in Section EC.4, evaluating both in-sample and
out-of-sample fit for di↵erent model specifications.
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Finally, we find no evidence of an endorsement or persuasion e↵ect, estimated through parameter
  in models ME=11 and M
E=1
4 . Across all four models, the persuasion e↵ect is small in magnitude,
negative in sign and not statistically significant. This is consistent with Banerjee et al. (2013) (their
specification corresponds to ME=11 ). For the other parameters, the estimates are similar to the
models without the endorsement e↵ect.
5. Counterfactuals
We use counterfactuals to evaluate various seeding strategies based on Friendship, Leadership and
Hybrid categories. Specifically, we consider the friendship paradox based Local Friend strategy,
Opinion Leader as well as Hybrid strategies that combine the features of sampling on friends
along with information on opinion leaders in Table 8. We examine two di↵erent hybrid strategies:
choosing a random friend of a leader household (weak hybrid) or choosing a random leader friend
of a leader household (strong hybrid). We use the random seeding strategy as the benchmark. In
our villages, each leader is connected to at least one other leader, so this does not result in an
empty set. To evaluate whether the impact of seeding is due to the network position or due to
the di↵erential impact by individual characteristics of leaders, we seed with leader-like individuals,
similar to leaders along 3 dimensions: degree, eigenvector and power centrality (Bonacich 1987).
Further details including informational requirements are provided in Section EC.5.
Table 8 Strategies and Implementation
Category Strategy Implementation Procedure (for each of m seeds)
Friendship Local Friend Select node at random from list. Obtain one randomly
chosen friend of node as a seed.
Leader Leader Select node from list of leaders
Like Leader Select leader node ` at random. Select the non-leader
node most similar to ` in terms of network properties.
Hybrid Friend of Leader
(Weak Hybrid)
Select a random leader from list of leaders. Obtain one
randomly chosen friend of this leader as a seed.
Leader Friend of Leader
(Strong Hybrid)
Select a random leader from list of leaders. Obtain one
randomly chosen friend who is also a leader to be seed.
We use the estimated parameters from ME=02 for the counterfactual simulations below. In the
Supplement, we provide a comparison of the counterfactual results of all the di↵erent model spec-
ifications summarized in Table 6. We set seeding level at 1% of the number of households in the
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village; therefore number of households seeded varies across villages as a function of village popu-
lations. We examine the sensitivity of the results to di↵erent seeding levels in Section 5.1 below.
We evaluate seeding e↵ectiveness in terms of proportion of informed households and adoption
generated by the seeding strategies. Table 9 reports the aggregate statistics on the proportion of
households informed about the microfinance service and the proportion adopting microfinance. The
improvement for Local Friend over Random is about 21%, while the improvement over Random
for Leader is about 12%. We also find that the Hybrid strategy Friend of Leader performs the best
with a 23% improvement over Random, suggesting that the two broad approaches of leveraging
network structure (using friendship paradox) and leadership or other demographic characteristics
(using Leader indicator) can be profitably combined to achieve higher performance. However, we
note that using the Local strategy alone without any information about the network structure or
leader information can generate much of this performance benefit. Overall, the Local Friend and
Hybrid strategies do better than the Leader strategy without data on network structure, suggesting
that they are viable approaches to seeding WOM with unknown networks.
Table 9 Comparison of Strategies (1% seeding)
Strategy
Informed (%) Adopted (%)  Informed(%)  Adopted(%)
Mean SD Mean SD over Random over Random
Random 38.410 39.110 7.750 24.440
Local Friend 45.520 41.020 9.370 26.980 18.520 21.010
Leader 42.700 40.360 8.670 25.880 11.190 11.900
Like Leader 42.970 40.450 8.800 26.120 11.890 13.560
Hybrid Strategies:
Friend of Leader 46.250 41.190 9.570 27.230 20.410 23.550
Leader Friend of Leader 43.380 40.290 8.890 26.160 12.960 14.770
Next, we examine the consistency of relative performance of the various seeding strategies across
villages. Figure 1 provides an overall comparison of the 4 strategies with the adoption levels of
Leader, Local Friend and Hybrid strategies plotted against one another. We find that both Local
Friend and Friend of Leader consistently perform better on adoption relative to Random as all
villages fall above the diagonal. In contrast, while Leader is better than Random for most villages,
it is worse for some villages, as shown by the points that fall above the diagonal in the top-left
panel.
The Local Friend strategy also outperforms the Leader strategy across most villages (88.37%).
Moreover, the villages where the Leader strategy performs especially well are smaller (fewer number
of households). In terms of the hybrid strategies, we find that the weak hybrid Friend of Leader
14
Figure 1 Comparison of Strategies across Villages (1% of Households Seeded).
(% Adopting Households)
(a) Leader versus Other Strategies


























































(b) Local versus Other Strategies


























































(c) Friend of Leader versus Other Strategies





















































(d) Leader Friend of Leader versus Other Strategies


















































Note: Each data point circle is a village network in all panels. The size of the shape is proportional to the size
of the village (number of households). Darker colors indicate overlap between villages.
mostly outperforms Leader, it does not do better than Local in general. The strong hybrid Leader
Friend of Leader actually performs worse than the Local Friend and weak hybrid strategy. In many
villages, it performs worse than the Leader strategy as well.
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Another pertinent issue is noting the region towards the bottom left of the graphs. The villages
clustered here display low rates of adoption in general, and thus any improvement made by the
proposed strategies in these villages is likely to be especially useful. Note that while the above figure
illustrated adoption levels, we detail the communication and proportion of households informed in
Section EC.5.
Table 10 reports the pairwise comparison in Figure 1 numerically. Local is uniformly better than
Random and leads to improved adoption in 100% of the villages. As anticipated from the figure,
Leader does worse than random in about 12% of of the villages. The hybrid Friend of Leader
strategy is also better than random in all villages, but the hybrid Leader Friend of Leader actually
performs worse than random in about 10% of the villages. This implies that it matters how the
hybrid strategy is implemented, and whether the condition of leadership is required for not just
the initial node but also for the friend. The results suggest that it actually reduces e↵ectiveness of
seeding when we require that the nominated friend also be a leader. Finally, we note that the Like
Leader strategy is the most similar in performance to the leader strategy.
Table 10 Pairwise Comparison of Strategies (1% seeding)
Local Friend
Leader
Like Friend of Leader Friend
Friend Leader Leader of Leader
Random 100.00 88.37 95.35 100.00 90.70
Local Friend 11.63 20.93 53.49 30.23
Leader 62.79 88.37 67.44
Like Leader 83.72 44.19
Friend of Leader 27.91
Note: % of villages where column strategy achieves higher adoption than row strategy
5.1. How does Extent of Seeding Impact Performance of Strategies?
The purpose of word-of-mouth marketing is to choose a small number of seeds to help spread
information about a product or service. We summarize in Table 11 how the performance of the
seeding strategies varies with the proportion of nodes seeded, at 0.5%, 1%, and 5% of nodes seeded.
For full results across all model specifications, see Supplement Section EC.7.
We define the performance metric as leverage, in terms of how well a proposed seeding strategy
s performs relative to Random:
Leverage(s) =
# Households Adopting under Strategy s
# Households Adopting under Random
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Table 11 Leverage for Counterfactual Strategies
No Endorsement With Endorsement
Strategy Seeding at: 0.5% 1% 5% 0.5% 1% 5%
Local Friend 1.293 1.210 1.116 1.1247 1.236 1.122
Leader 1.160 1.119 1.064 1.123 1.112 1.068
Like Leader 1.181 1.136 1.064 1.120 1.130 1.073
Hybrid Strategies:
Friend of Leader (Weak) 1.309 1.235 1.119 1.129 1.241 1.126
Leader Friend of Leader (Strong) 1.210 1.148 1.070 1.152 1.160 1.074
The following observations are noteworthy. First, the leader strategy always outperforms the
random strategy and the local strategy always outperforms the leader. Thus, our main results hold
across the range of seeding proportions examined. Second, the weak hybrid strategy dominates all
the others, whereas the strong hybrid consistently underperforms the Local Friend strategy. Third,
Like Leader performs very similar to leader, indicating that performance of the leader strategy is
not driven by the di↵erential leader e↵ects, but network position of leaders. Finally, leverage for
all strategies decreases as the number of seeds increases.
5.2. How does Network Structure Moderate Seeding Performance?
We evaluate how network characteristics moderate the relative performance (leverage) of the var-
ious seeding strategies. We regress leverage as the dependent variable against network summary
characteristics from Table 2. This analysis is feasible because we observe di↵usion and adoption
across several village social networks, in contrast to online scholars typically working with one large
social network (e.g., Facebook, Twitter).
Table 12 details the regression estimates. Degree distribution (mean or standard deviation) has
no significant e↵ect on performance of seeding strategy. Network density has a positive e↵ect on
performance of leader and friend of leader strategies, but not the others.High levels of clustering
with strong social communities imply WOM can be easily transmitted within communities but
might be more di cult across communities. As such a friend based seeding strategy is unlikely to
help improve adoption on highly clustered networks due to similarity in connections. Empirically,
we find little e↵ect of clustering on seeding strategy performance, likely due to the limited variance
in clustering across village networks, which may be formed by similar social processes.
A low average path length (APL) implies that any node can be reached from any other using a
relatively short path. This is typically due to redundancies in paths. With higher levels of redun-
dancy, obtaining a higher degree node is not as valuable for di↵usion. However, with low levels of
redundancy (or high APL), it becomes more valuable to have well-connected seeds that can reach
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Table 12 Performance of Strategies Based on Network Characteristics
Leverage of Strategy
Local Leader Friend of Leader Friend
Leader of Leader
Mean Degree 0.029  0.009 0.019  0.017
(0.039) (0.035) (0.032) (0.036)
Std. Dev. of Degree  0.027 0.019  0.022 0.046
(0.044) (0.038) (0.036) (0.040)
Density 1.840 4.219⇤ 3.738⇤ 1.682
(2.490) (2.185) (2.046) (2.277)
Global Clustering  0.005 0.756 0.159 0.100
(0.798) (0.700) (0.656) (0.730)
APL 0.418⇤⇤⇤ 0.290⇤⇤⇤ 0.386⇤⇤⇤ 0.293⇤⇤⇤
(0.049) (0.043) (0.040) (0.045)
Assortativity  0.796  0.720  0.327 1.200⇤⇤
(0.621) (0.545) (0.510) (0.568)
R2 0.9875 0.9882 0.9918 0.9879
Residual Std. Error (df = 36) 0.153 0.136 0.125 0.142
F Statistic (df = 7; 36) 422.605⇤⇤⇤ 431.474⇤⇤⇤ 647.992⇤⇤⇤ 423.218⇤⇤⇤
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
all other nodes through relatively short paths. Consistent with this, we find that an increase in
APL improves the e cacy of friendship paradox based seeding strategies.
Local friend should work better when there is negative assortativity, when low degree nodes
are connected to high degree nodes. With positive assortativity, low degree nodes are connected
to similar low degree nodes. Local friend seeding is likely to yield relatively higher degree nodes
when there is negative assortativity, with a star network being an extreme example. Though as
expected the signs are negative, they are found not significant. However, the leader friend of leader
strategy will benefit from positive assortativity because a leader’s leader friend also having high
degree benefits the strategy. Indeed the coe cient is positive and significant. Overall, of the 4
characteristics, the most consistent impact is path length in the network.
6. Conclusion
We estimate a model of network-mediated WOM and product adoption and evaluated the e↵ective-
ness of alternative seeding strategies that leverage the friendship paradox. The proposed friendship
paradox based strategies, which are informationally light and require little knowledge of network
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structure significantly improve WOM seeding and product adoption relative to not just random
seeding, but also relative to opinion leader seeding. Specifically, we find a 15-20% improvement in
both information spread and adoption compared with Random, and about 8% improvement over
Leader seeding used by the firm.
We also find that network structure-based strategies can be combined with Leader strategies in
hybrid strategies to achieve even higher performance. However, imposing stronger conditions on the
hybrid results in poorer performance. Thus, we must balance the somewhat greater informational
requirements of the hybrid strategy against higher performance. Overall, the proposed strategies are
uniformly better across all the villages with varying network structures, whereas Leader strategies
can be worse than Random in a significant number of village networks. We also show that the
e↵ectiveness of the seeding strategies depends on network structure, as characterized by summary
statistics like average path length and density. A caveat is worth noting: the seeding strategies are
stochastic, in the sense that they do not choose pre-determined individuals or households. Thus,
any performance guarantees can only be made in expectation.
We find the advantage of both Local Friend and hybrid strategies relative to the random strategy
to be inversely related to the proportion of nodes seeded. Thus, when we have few seeds, these
strategies become even more advantageous. This might be relevant in cases where the target pop-
ulation is large, and the intervention is somewhat costly, either in monetary terms or in terms
of urgency or because of other operational limitations. Finally, we find that structural properties
of networks can impact the relative performance of strategies, with higher path length strongly
associated with increased performance.
We leave some important issues for future research. First, a promising approach consideres the
speed of di↵usion and the potential to use seeds nominated by others as “gossipers” as having
potential to accelerate di↵usion and higher overall adoption (Stephen and Lehmann 2016, Banerjee
et al. 2014). An interesting question would be to examine whether friendship could be combined
as a hybrid with such approaches (e.g. friend of a gossiper). Second, it would be useful to consider
whether seeding approaches proposed here need to be adapted for highly asymmetric networks,
where directionality becomes significant (Ben Sliman and Kohli 2018).
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In Table EC.1 below, we define the terms used in networks. These terms are helpful when we
define network properties and in the moment conditions. Some network characteristics used in our
analysis are defined in Table EC.2.
Table EC.1 Network Terminology
Characteristic Description Definition
Nodes Degree Number of connections (edges) of i Di
Edge Connection between nodes i and j eij 2 {0,1}
Adjacency (Edge)
Matrix
Connection between nodes i and j E,Ei,j 2 {0,1}
Node Set Set of all N nodes in Network V = {1,2, . . . ,N}
Edge Set Set of all edges in Network E = {(i, j) : eij = 1}
Network Edge Count Number of undirected connections e=
P
i2V,j>i eij
Seeds Set of all nodes chosen as seeds S
Adopters Set of all nodes which have adopted A
Reachable Set Nodes with adoption status s2 {A,NA} reach-




Fraction of adopting nodes among those reach-
able from node i in k steps
zi(k) =
|EAi (k)|
|EAi (k)|+ |ENAi (k)|
Vector of above Vector of adopting proportion of neighbors for
each node
z(k) = [z1(k), . . . , zN(k)]
Minimum Distance Distance of Shortest Path between i and j  ij =mink s.t.Ek(i,j) > 0
EC.2. Estimation
First, we detail the estimation of the adoption process, followed by the WOM communication
process, and finally detail bootstrapping to obtain standard errors. We simulated Nsim = 150 dif-
fusion paths based on NS = 1 seed chosen using each of the seeding strategies. The reported WOM
communication parameters are based on the average of the simulated di↵usion paths.
Adoption Process
The adoption parameter vector is  0, . . . , 6. The logistic regression specification for the adoption
decision follows from the utility specification. The log likelihood for household i is li(✓|Xi) and for
all households in the network is l( |X)







Table EC.2 Network Characteristics
CharacteristicDescription Definition
Density Ratio of the number of edges




Clustering Ratio of the number of closed
triads (triangles) to the num-
ber of possible triads
P
i 6=j 6=k eijejkP
i 6=j 6=k 1
Average Path
Length
Average of Minimum Dis-


















1. We examine global clustering in the formula above.
2. For Average Path Length,  ij is the minimum distance between nodes i and j
as defined in Table EC.1.
3. There are measures of assortativity based on homophily, e.g. gender or income




The adoption process is estimated by maximum likelihood estimation.
WOM Process
Given adoption parameters  , the WOM process is simulated separately for each village network.
We track two states for each household: its information state and its adoption state. The infor-
mation states are uninformed (U) and informed (I), whereas the adoption states are Not-adopted
(NA) and Adopted (A). Both the Informed and Adopted states are absorbing states.
The WOM process for each of the Nsim simulations begins with Step (0) and then proceeds
through Steps (1)-(3) for each time period.
(0) Each household (node) in the network is initially in an uninformed (U) information state. In
initial period t= 0. the seed nodes are chosen in each network based on the sampling algorithm.
In the actual data, the seed nodes in each village were chosen based on the opinion leadership
criterion. In the counterfactual scenarios, seed nodes are chosen based on an alternative sam-
pling method (Random, Local or Global etc.). In all cases, the information state of the seed
nodes changes from Uninformed (U)  ! Informed (I).
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The following process (1) – (3) process then takes place in each period t2 {1,2, . . . , Tv} for village
v. The number of time periods varies across villages in the data, with a mean of 6.5 and SD of
1.83.
(1) At the beginning, a household that has become informed decides whether to adopt.
(2) Then, according to its adoption status, a household can probabilistically communicate about
the microfinance product with each of its network neighbors. The probability of such commu-
nication ps(D) may depend on both its degree D, i.e. the number of neighbors the informed
node has, as well as the adoption state s2 {A,NA} of the informed node. We separate out the
probabilities pNA(D) and pA(D) as detailed in §3.
(3) When this communication takes place, the neighbor receiving information changes its infor-
mation state from Uninformed (U)  ! Informed (I). If the neighbor node has already been
informed earlier, there is no change in its Informed (I) state.
For each simulation and for each village, we compute 7 moments according to Table EC.3 at the end
of T periods of simulation. Thus, we have Nmoments = 7⇥43 = 301 moments across the villages with
microfinance adoption. We then minimize the MSM objective function S(✓) detailed in equation
(7) from §3 in the [0,1]K region to obtain the probability parameter estimates presented in Table
7 in Section 4. For the MSM objective, we start with the initial weight matrix set to the identity
matrix to obtain consistent estimates.
Standard Errors with Bootstrap Estimation
We obtain standard errors for the communication probability parameters using a bootstrap proce-
dure detailed below. First, we obtain NR = 5,000 draws using a random grid for the communication








We proceed through Steps (a) – (c) below for each of the Nsim draws to obtain moments for
each village v.
(a): We choose seeds corresponding to the Leader strategy used in the data.
(b): We compute the simulated WOM Process detailed above for Tv periods for each draw of the
parameter vector q.
(c): We use the cross-section and time series adoption status data to compute the moments detailed
in Table EC.3 separately for each village.
Compute B = 10,000 bootstrap estimates using the moments obtained from the samples above.
For b= 1,2, . . . ,B do Steps (d) – (f) below.
(d): Resample with replacement from moments from the set of villages showing microfinance activ-
ity.
(e): Compute the objective function with the resampled moments at each of the NR points evalu-
ated above.
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Table EC.3 List of Moments.
Symbol Description Definition





MC1 Proportion of seeds adopting
|S \A|
|S|
MC2 Proportion of households with no adopting neighbors who
have adopted
P
i2A I [Ni \A=  ]P
i2V I [Ni \A=  ]









MC5 Covariance between a household’s adoption and average
adoption of their first degree neighbors
cov (y, z(1))
MC6 Covariance between a household’s adoption and average
adoption of their second degree neighbors
cov (y, z(2))
(f): Choose the parameter vector with the minimum objective as the estimate  (b) to be used in
the bootstrap.
The distribution of  (b), with b= 1,2, . . . ,B provides the bootstrap estimate distribution for com-
puting standard errors.
EC.3. Moment Conditions for Estimation
In this section, we describe the rationales for the moments listed in Table EC.3 that we use in our
estimation.
In general, all moments are informative in the estimation of all parameters. However, the con-
nections between some moments and parameters are more intuitive. Moment MT1 is especially
important for identification when there are di↵erential e↵ects for leaders. We describe the moments
and the obvious associated links with parameters below.
(MC1) is the proportion of seeds that have adopted. Since the seeds are guaranteed to be
informed outside the WOM process, this allows us to estimate the parameters impacting adoption
probability without relying on the communication process. In contrast, (MC2) is the proportion of
households with no adopting neighbors who adopt, which allows us to match a non-adopter’s com-
munication likelihood, because such an adopting household could only have received information
from neighbors, all of whom are non-adopters.
(MC3) is the proportion of neighbors of adopting seeds who have adopted. This moment most
closely connects to the WOM probability of adopters, since the neighbors of seeds have a high
probability of receiving information from the seeds. With (MC4), the proportion of nodes that are
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neighbors of non-adopting seeds who adopt. The focus here is primarily on parameters qNA0 and
qNA1 . With low probability, it becomes less likely that neighbors of non-adopting seeds would adopt
(all else being equal).
(MC5) and (MC6) captures the relationship between adoption by a focal household and its first
and second degree neighbors. This is particularly important in networks where there is a significant
region (or sub-network) that is uninformed. In such regions of the network, both a focal node and
its neighbors will have zero adoption, which results in a perfect correlation. Observe that in such
a case, (MC2) and (MC4) are not informative since the moment will have values exactly zero for
such sub-networks. Thus (MC5) and (MC6) can also be viewed as characterizing the limits of the
WOM process.
(MT1) matches the cumulative overall adoption in each time period within each village. This is
the typical data used in estimation of aggregate Bass-like di↵usion models. The (MT1) moment
helps us to estimate the time-path of the di↵usion process. In each period of the model, based
on the network structure and the di↵usion of the information process, we have di↵erent number
of households which potentially become informed and therefore have the opportunity to make
adoption choices.
Overall, we need to have moments that match global network-level measures, e.g. (MC1) that
focuses on overall adoption. It is also critically important to incorporate moments that match local
network structure, allowing these connections to have a strong impact on the adoption process,
which is what distinguishes the network approach from the Bass model.
EC.4. Model Fit
Additional Model Fit Metrics
Next, we evaluate the fit of these models below using 3 additional measures. The metrics used for
fit are as follows:
1. First, we regress the actual adoption rate during each time period in the data (as depen-
dent variable) against the simulated adoption rate obtained from the model, similar to what
Banerjee et al. (2013) present in Table 2 of their paper. The intercept terms are found not
significant, and the coe cient of interest across all models indicate that the model is able to
capture and characterize the essential dynamics of the process. If the coe cient of simulated
adoption is close to 1, that would indicate a good fit.
2. Next, we examine typical fit measure like RMSE (root mean squared error) and MAPE
(Mean Absolute Percent / Proportion Error). Lower values of these measures indicate better
fit.
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We find that the model fit is consistent with the original paper for in-sample fit (see Table 2 of
Banerjee et al. (2013)). We then examine out of sample fit by estimate our preferred models using
85% of the villages, and holding the remaining 15% of the sample as holdout. We find that the
out of sample fit is not significantly worse than in sample fit, indicating the models do not su↵er
from an obvious overfitting problem. Banerjee et al. (2013) do not provide out of sample fit in their
paper.
Table EC.4 provides the in-sample and out-of-sample fit for our preferred models. We note that
the coe cients on simulated adoption for both in-sample and out-of-sample are between 0.87 and
0.89. The RMSE and MAPE measures are similar for both of our chosen models, and it is useful to
verify that the out-of-sample fit is not much worse than in-sample fit. If out-of-sample were indeed
much worse, then we should be concerned about the model overfitting the data.
Table EC.4 Main Models: In Sample and Out of Sample Model Fit Measures








Intercept 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.001
(SE) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Simulated Adoption 0.874 0.89 0.875 0.87
(SE) 0.097 0.098 0.096 0.1
RMSE 0.067 0.067 0.069 0.069
MAPE (⇥100%) 0.379 0.372 0.395 0.406
Table EC.5 provides results for all the model specifications. We find that across the specifications,
the models seem to be fairly similar in terms of their fit.
















Intercept 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.000 -0.004 0.001
(SE) (0.021) (0.02) (0.02) (0.021) (0.019) (0.02) (0.02) (0.021)
S.Adoption 0.877 0.874 0.901 0.899 0.867 0.89 0.904 0.876
(SE) (0.103) (0.097) (0.100) (0.105) (0.096) (0.098) (0.099) (0.104)
RMSE 0.068 0.067 0.067 0.068 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.068
MAPE (⇥100%) 0.385 0.379 0.375 0.384 0.379 0.372 0.377 0.393
EC.5. Comparison of Strategies
In Figure EC.1, we plot the performance of the strategies pairwise, where performance is measured
by the proportion of informed households in each counterfactual strategy evaluation.
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Figure EC.1 Comparison of Strategies across Villages (1% of Households Seeded).
(% Informed Households)
(a) Leader versus Other Strategies


















































(b) Local versus Other Strategies


















































(c) Friend of Leader versus Other Strategies













































(d) Leader Friend of Leader versus Other Strategies










































Note: Each data point triangle is a village network in all panels. The size of the shape
is proportional to the size of the village (number of households). Darker colors indicate
overlap between villages.
EC.6. Strategy Implementation
We detail the implementation of each of the strategies here in Table EC.6 below.
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Table EC.6 Strategies and Implementation
Category Strategy Implementation Procedure
(for each of m seeds)
Information Required
Random Random Select node at random from list
as seed.
Randomly sampled subset
of list of individuals (or
Complete List)
Friendship Local Friend Select node at random from
list. Obtain one randomly chosen
friend of node as a seed.
Randomly sampled subset
of list of individuals +
Obtain random friend
Leader Leader Select node from list of leaders List of Leaders (where
leadership is specific to
domain)
Like Leader Select leader node ` at random.
Select the non-leader node most
similar to ` in terms of network
properties‡.
List of leaders + Entire
Social Network
Hybrid Friend of Leader
(Weak Hybrid)
Select a random leader from list
of leaders. Obtain one randomly
chosen friend of this leader as a
seed.





Select a random leader from
list of leaders. Obtain one ran-
domly chosen friend who is also
a leader to be seed.
List of leaders + List
of leader friends of each
leader
Other Strategies Not Examined in this Paper
Influence Most Central Select most central node as seed Complete List of Nodes
+ Degrees of all nodes
+ Relevant Network of
Connections (Depends on
domain of interest)6
Most Influential Compute Influence Score (e.g.
Clout) for each node
List of Nodes + Rele-
vant Network of Connec-
tions + Outcome variable
to measure past influence
+ Attribution Mechanism
‡ : Similarity between nodes in network position could be implemented using the following
centrality metrics (among others): degree, eigenvector, Bonancich power centrality
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EC.7. Leverage Under Di↵erent Models
We examine how the number of seeds impacts the performance of di↵erent seeding strategies in
the counterfactual across the full set of model specifications. We examine seeding at the level of
0.5%, 1%, and 5% to understand how the level of seeding a↵ects relative benefits of our friendship
paradox strategies. The results for di↵erent seeding levels are detailed in Tables EC.7 to EC.9.
A few observations are relevant here:
(a) Leader strategy always outperforms the random node strategy for any combination of model
/ (#seeds)
(b) The friendship paradox based Local strategy achieves higher performance (leverage) than leader
under all of the model specifications.
(c) The Hybrid seeding strategy achieves better performance than Local strategy in most model
specifications. However, the leader hybrid strategy seems to consistently underperform the
Leader strategy
(d) The “Like Leader” strategy performs very similar to leader (within 2-3% of the leverage metric).
(e) Leverage for all counterfactual strategies decreases as the number of seeds increases. Of course,
in the limit where all nodes are chosen to be seeds, then all strategies perform equally well.
Table EC.7 Leverage for Counterfactual Strategies




















Leader 1.069 1.064 1.070 1.064 1.069 1.068 1.059 1.070 1.050 1.066
Local Friend 1.128 1.116 1.120 1.118 1.116 1.122 1.120 1.123 1.091 1.108
Hybrid 1.121 1.119 1.119 1.118 1.126 1.126 1.121 1.127 1.086 1.114
Leader Hybrid 1.077 1.070 1.069 1.065 1.078 1.074 1.066 1.079 1.051 1.067
Like Leader 1.067 1.064 1.066 1.066 1.069 1.073 1.057 1.068 1.053 1.063
Table EC.8 Leverage for Counterfactual Strategies




















Leader 1.121 1.119 1.125 1.136 1.103 1.112 1.133 1.116 1.108 1.111
Local Friend 1.202 1.210 1.198 1.210 1.224 1.236 1.222 1.206 1.178 1.195
Hybrid 1.230 1.235 1.207 1.226 1.218 1.241 1.238 1.209 1.203 1.203
Leader Hybrid 1.131 1.148 1.126 1.148 1.137 1.160 1.139 1.128 1.115 1.130
Like Leader 1.122 1.136 1.113 1.121 1.112 1.130 1.108 1.105 1.110 1.107
ec10
Table EC.9 Leverage for Counterfactual Strategies




















Leader 1.164 1.160 1.135 1.161 1.137 1.123 1.145 1.155 1.142 1.153
Local Friend 1.299 1.293 1.272 1.283 1.282 1.247 1.283 1.256 1.255 1.266
Hybrid 1.310 1.309 1.261 1.292 1.318 1.294 1.310 1.302 1.256 1.281
Leader Hybrid 1.232 1.210 1.160 1.191 1.203 1.152 1.163 1.196 1.157 1.171
Like Leader 1.163 1.181 1.117 1.142 1.164 1.120 1.164 1.133 1.139 1.136
